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ABSTRACT 
 
The United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in French Indochina, 1950-1956. 
(December 2010) 
Nathaniel R. Weber, B.A., Westminster College 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Brian Linn 
 
 This thesis examines the American Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG) sent to French Indochina, from 1950 to 1956, when the United States provided 
major monetary and material aid to the French in their war against the communist Viet 
Minh.  MAAG observed French units in the field and monitored the flow of American 
materiel into the region.  Relying upon primary research in the National Archives, the 
thesis departs from previous interpretations by showing that MAAG held generally 
positive assessments of France‟s performance in Indochina.  The thesis also argues that 
MAAG personnel were more interested in getting material support to the French, than in 
how that material was used, to the point of making unrealistic assessments of French 
combat abilities.  By connecting primary research with the greater history of Cold War 
American military assistance, the thesis contributes to the scholarship on American 
involvement in Vietnam. 
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 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 In early 1952, a United States Army observer stationed in French Indochina 
wrote that before “August 1950, French Union Forces in Indo-China were poorly 
equipped.  .   .   .  Particularly lacking were motor vehicles, radios, artillery weapons, 
modern automatic weapons, combat vehicles, ammunition and spare parts.”  But 
France‟s military situation had improved greatly since those dark days, because the 
United States had delivered large quantities of war materiel to the French.1  By 1952, the 
French not only drove American-made trucks and tanks, flew American aircraft, and 
fired American machine guns and howitzers, they wore American helmets and uniforms, 
ate American military rations, and drifted onto airborne drop-zones beneath American 
parachutes.  France and its colonial possessions fought the war, but, post-1950, the 
United States subsidized their effort.2 
 This US Army observer belonged to the Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG), sent to Indochina in 1950 to monitor the use of, American military materiel 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of The Journal of Military History. 
1 Field Estimate of Effectiveness of French Union Forces (hereafter Field Estimate), February 1952, box 1, 
Security Classified General Records 1950-1954 (hereafter SCGR), MAAG Adjutant General Division, 
Record Group 472, Records of the United States Forces in Southeast Asia (hereafter RG 472), National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter NARA). 
2 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 25.  By 1953, the US footed 40 percent of France‟s war bill in Indochina. 
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delivered to support France in its war against the communist-led Viet Minh.  Increasing 
fear of communist expansion in Asia, especially after the detonation of a Soviet atomic 
weapon and then “fall” of China to Mao Zedong, had led the United States to reverse 
long-held policies of anti-colonialism.  MAAG‟s mission to the French was America‟s 
first real foray into the complex and violent politics of the region, and represented one of 
many American advisory and assistance missions around the world, during those early 
years of the Cold War. 
Though the historiography of US military assistance in general, and US relations 
with France during the French Indochina War, is significant, both subject areas often 
overlook the activities of MAAG in Indochina.  Works on US military assistance during 
the Cold War, are quiet on MAAG-Indochina, usually focusing on either Korea or the 
post-French period of American Vietnam involvement.  Robert Ramsey‟s Advising 
Indigenous Forces deals with American activities early in the Vietnam War, but does not 
discuss the period of Franco-American interaction.3 Vietnam Studies: Command and 
Control 1950-1969, an Army publication from 1973, gave a cursory overview of 
MAAG‟s operations during the French war.4  From the same series of works, Training 
the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 spends little time in the period before France‟s  
                                                 
3 Robert D. Ramsey III, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El 
Salvador (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006). 
4 George S. Eckardt, Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950-1969 (Washington, DC: Department 
of the Army, 1973). 
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1956 withdrawal.5  Essay collections are also vague.  Military Advising and Assistance: 
From Mercenaries to Privatization covers, among other topics, US advisors to the 
Republic of Korea, Communist Chinese support of the Algerians in North Africa, and 
American Air Force advisors to the South Vietnamese, but does not mention the French 
experience.6  William H. Mott‟s two-part study of US military assistance abroad does 
not address American support of the French in the early 1950s, except to discuss US 
security policy in South East Asia.7  
Of major relevance to this thesis is Chester J. Pach‟s Arming the Free World, 
which examines the origins of US military aid in the early years of the Cold War.  Pach 
argues that US aid was influenced by fear of communist expansion around the world, 
and was done primarily to hold up the morale of allied countries under the threat of 
communist uprisings and/or invasions. This made the “giving of military aid more 
important than the specific purposes to which the aid was put.”8  Furthermore, military 
aid was useful for “preparing for a possible war, securing customers for American 
armaments industries, checking the spread of Soviet influence, and cultivating foreign 
goodwill.”9 Pach looks at military aid at the macro-level, studying overall American 
                                                 
5 James Lawton Collins, The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army, 1950-1972 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1974). 
6 Donald Stoker, ed., Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815-2007 
(New York: Routledge, 2008),  81-150. 
7 William H. Mott, IV, United States Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1999), 313-316, and United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002).  
8 Chester J. Pach, Arming the Free World (Chapel Hill: the University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 230. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
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policy-making, but his work does not examine what this assistance missions looked like 
on the ground.  
Historians of the Vietnam War and on Franco-American relations during the war 
have also pay limited attention to MAAG‟s efforts in Indochina, and have concluded that 
French hostility toward MAAG prevented effective cooperation.  Mark Atwood 
Lawrence‟s Assuming the Burden examines American decisions support France in 
Indochina, but the actual role of MAAG, and the materiel it monitored, falls outside the 
book‟s focus, appearing only briefly in the conclusion.10 This alleged hostility came 
from the American insistence that the French increase the size of the Vietnamese army 
and the importance of its role—and, that France grant Vietnamese independence.  From 
the American perspective, such steps would be the only way to defeat the popular forces 
behind the Viet Minh.  From the French perspective, it would defeat their very purpose 
for fighting the war, the retention of Indochina as a colonial possession.  As a visible 
reminder of American power and influence, MAAG thus received much of France‟s 
hostility toward the idea. Kathryn C. Statler argues that French interference and 
disorganization made MAAG‟s mission difficult.11  George Herring accused the French 
                                                 
10 Mark Atwood Lawrence, Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in 
Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 276. 
11 Kathryn Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam (Lexington, 
Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 27.  French Indochina, Indochina, and the Associated 
States all refer to the area controlled by France as a colony as a whole, ie, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. 
Indochinese refers to any individual indigenous to that region. Vietnam and Vietnamese refer specifically 
to members of that country.  French, unless otherwise stated, refers to not only metropolitan French 
military units, but also to those Indochinese units allied to the French (ie, combat elements of the 
Associated States).   
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of “reducing MAAG to virtual impotence” by sending their requests for aid to higher 
echelons of American command and by doing all that they could in Vietnam to block 
American attempts at dealing directly with the Vietnamese.12  Ronald Spector held that 
French restrictions on American movement, antiquated management processes, and 
obstinate behavior made MAAG‟s mission difficult in the extreme.  He also maintained 
that MAAG had poor opinions of the French.13 Both Herring and Statler cited Spector‟s 
work as their source; Spector himself used interviews and State Department records to 
support his argument, but cited few MAAG documents. 
 A closer examination of MAAG documents from 1950 to 1956 paint a rather 
different picture.  Overall, the reports state that the French maintained their US-provided 
equipment well, and, with some reservation, even praised France‟s combat performance 
against the Viet Minh.  US Army observers, though pleased with the fighting abilities of 
French army units, criticized the French for failing to train the Vietnamese and for 
lacking an offensive spirit.  US Navy officers, though not as complimentary as those in 
the Army, contributed little to MAAG documents; this low volume could be attributed to 
both the small size of France‟s navy in Indochina, as well as its “brown water” character.  
During this period, the US Navy struggled to establish a raison d’être in the atomic age, 
which did not involve the establishment of American riverine capabilities.  The strongest 
disapproval came from the US Air Force personnel, who consistently found fault in the  
                                                 
12 Herring, America’s Longest War, 19. 
13 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years: The U.S. Army in Vietnam (Washington, DC: 
Center for Military History Publishing, 1983), 117-119.   
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French air force.  They accused the French of poor logistical and maintenance practices, 
and for having limited combat value.  These problems were largely due to the French air 
force‟s personnel shortages in Indochina (something to which USAF MAAG personnel 
admitted), as well as a lack of experience in large-scale aerial operations during World 
War II. 
 This thesis will examine the contents of these reports and show how MAAG‟s 
view of the French was not as critical as earlier historians have argued.  It also provides 
a detailed look at the daily operations of an American military assistance and advisory 
mission during the early years of the Cold War.  The scholarship lacks such a study, and 
the insights it provides on American perceptions of the French Indochina War, and how 
American anti-communism shaped MAAG‟s assessments of the fighting.  Chapter II 
provides a background of the war in French Indochina, including an explanation as to 
how the United States became involved in the region.  It draws on the large secondary 
literature available on the subject.  After a summary of the remaining years of the war, 
continuing through the decisive Battle of Dien Bien Phu and France‟s complete 
withdrawal from Indochina in 1956, it discusses the overall structure of MAAG and the 
types of documents it produced.  It also shows how, in the early 1950s, the US military‟s 
scholarly journals published few articles on the topics of unconventional warfare of the 
type seen in Indochina, military advisory missions, and the war in French Indochina. 
 Chapters III and IV describe MAAG‟s assessment of the French by looking at the 
opinions held by each of MAAG‟s branches, the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The 
chapters will explain the relevant French branch‟s organization and mission in 
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Indochina, before examining each MAAG branch‟s assessments of their French 
counterparts.  Chapter III discusses the Army and its grading of France‟s ground forces 
in Indochina. Chapter IV discusses the same reviews made by Navy and Air Force of 
their French counterparts.  Most of Chapter IV concerns itself with the Air Force, 
because the US Navy produced far fewer documents than both the Army and Air Force, 
making a detailed assessment of naval opinions difficult. 
 This thesis concludes with a summary of MAAG‟s overall view of the French 
position in Indochina, and show, according to its major published reports, that it was 
relatively neutral toward the French, and, if anything, maintained an optimistic outlook 
for France and Vietnam‟s war against communism. Though the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force personnel all shared similar hesitations about French capabilities, MAAG as a 
whole followed the mostly positive assessment held by the US Army, even to the point 
of disregarding negative evaluations of the French made in MAAG reports.  This was 
likely because of  several reasons: the French army‟s operations in Indochina were much 
larger than those of the air force and navy, and consumed a far greater portion of US-
provided equipment, weapons, and supply, and because US Army personnel made up the 
majority of MAAG personnel in general, and all MAAG Chiefs were Army generals.  
Furthermore, the Army personnel‟s the positive assessments of the French most 
confirmed the optimistic aims of military aid during the early years of the Cold War.  
Thus, MAAG‟s assessments can be seen as more than evaluations of the French—they 
can also be read as affirmations of contemporary American military assistance policy. 
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CHAPTER II  
THE FRENCH INDOCHINA WAR, THE UNITED STATES, AND MAAG 
 
 
 When the United States began to supply France with military aid in 1950, France 
had already been fighting a vicious colonial war in Indochina for almost four years.  The 
American decision to support France had not been made lightly, and, in fact, opposed 
decades of professed American anti-colonialism and increasing diplomatic unease 
between France and the US since the former‟s rapid defeat in World War II.  This 
chapter discusses how growing tensions between the United States and the communist 
powers—the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China—drove the US to support French 
military efforts in Indochina through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program and the 
Military Assistance Advisory Group.  It also gives an overview of MAAG‟s activities in 
Indochina, outlining the unit‟s structure, mission, and shortcomings. 
 By the end of the 19th Century, thanks to a combination of treaties and invasions, 
France had conquered Laos, Cambodia, and the three regions now known as Vietnam—
Cochinchina (in the south), Annam, and Tonkin (in the north). Together they comprised 
French Indochina. France‟s Southeast Asian colony was rich in rice and several types of 
ore; it also served as a symbolic and strategic counter to the Asian possessions of Great 
Britain and the Netherlands.14  After the wars to conquer the region, soldiers in the  
                                                 
14 Fredrik Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War (New York: Pearson Education, 2001), 7-8. 
 9 
French army considered Indochina a choice assignment, with safe duty (relative to that 
in North Africa), plentiful women, and high pay.15  The French colonial administrators 
valued rice-producing Cochinchina the most, and land-locked, sparsely-populated Laos 
the least.16 
 A professed “liberal imperialism” drove the French colonial effort, concerned not 
only with gaining wealth and strategic position through the acquisition of colonies, but 
also “lifting up” the native peoples in those colonies.17  Despite official positions, this 
mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission) was essentially “conservative and anti-
revolutionary.”18  The French kept harsh control over Indochina; they kept Vietnamese 
out of leadership positions, except for a small number of French-educated elites 
(concentrated in the heavily populated and profitable Cochinchina). Imperial authorities 
ruthlessly hunted anti-French organizations.  
 These anti-French organizations proliferated in the first half of the twentieth 
century. A notion of Vietnamese nationalism provided the basis for most of these 
organizations, a centuries-old tradition of resisting outside invaders.  However, a 
combination of Vietnamese north/south disunity, class conflict, and French action 
(imperial authorities imprisoned, executed, or exiled Vietnamese nationalists) rendered 
                                                 
15 Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion: A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force (New 
York: Harper Collins, 1991), 506-507. 
16 Martin Stuart-Fox, “The French in Laos, 1887-1945,” Modern Asian Studies 29 (February 1995):  111. 
17 J. Kim Munholland, “The French Response to the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement, 1905-14,” The 
Journal of Modern History 47, no. 1 (1975): 655.  
18 Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, 8, and Munholland, “The French Response,” 675. 
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these nationalist movements ineffective.19  Even the efforts of notable Vietnamese 
nationalists, like Phan Boi Chau, foundered  as they failed to appeal to a broad enough 
base.20  They needed firm, unifying leadership, and a broad appeal, and this came to 
them in the form of Ho Chi Minh. Though an ardent communist, Ho was also a 
dedicated Vietnamese nationalist.21  He began to coalesce many of these groups into a 
united, communist-led front, eventually known as the Viet Minh.22 
 French counter-revolutionary efforts enjoyed continued success until the 
beginning of World War II.  The Germans crushed the metropole in early 1940, leaving 
France‟s colonies to their own devices. French Indochina was quite vulnerable.  French 
military planning had always left Indochina unprotected, hoping for Anglo-American 
help, or successful diplomatic action.23   Neither form of help arrived. 
 When Japan demanded access to Indochina as a staging area in 1940, the colonial 
government capitulated to the Japanese, a move that crippled their image in the region.  
Initially, Japan interfered  little with French control of the colony.  By March 1945, 
however, with Japan‟s overall military position weakening and French leadership in 
                                                 
19 Herring,  America’s Longest War, 19. 
20 William J. Duiker, “Phan Boi Chau: Asian Revolutionary in a Changing World,” The Journal of Asian 
Studies 31, (Nov 1971): 77.  Phan‟s plan to “evict the French” paid little to attention to the lower classes. 
21 Pierre Brocheux, Ho Chi Minh: A Biography (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 7-28. 
22 Herring, America’s Longest War, 5. 
23 Martin Thomas, “At the Heart of Things? French Imperial Defense Planning in the Late 1930s,” French 
Historical Studies 21 (Spring 1998): 333-334 and 351, and John F. Laffey, “French Far Eastern Policy in 
the 1930s,” Modern Asian Studies 23, no. 1 (1989), 149. 
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Indochina increasingly vocal and anti-Japanese, the Japanese overthrew the French 
government in Indochina and took direct control of the region. 24  Japan‟s seizure of 
control coincided with a severe famine in northern Vietnam, which provided numerous 
Vietnamese nationalist groups—including the Viet Minh—even more support against 
both the Japanese and the French.25  Japan‟s surrender in September 1945 left a power 
vacuum in Vietnam, which Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh immediately filled.  They 
centered their power in Tonkin, where they enjoyed widespread public support.26 
 After Japan‟s surrender, the Allies moved to accept the surrender of Japanese 
troops throughout Asia and the Pacific, and to establish interim governments in those 
regions where they were needed.  Allied command divided Indochina in half, along the 
17th Parallel, with Chiang Kai-Shek‟s Nationalist Chinese in charge of liberating north of 
that line (Tonkin, Laos, and parts of Annam), and Great Britain in charge of the south 
(Cambodia, parts of Annam, and Cochinchina).  The British assisted the French to 
reassert control in the south, while the Nationalist Chinese in the north were uninterested 
                                                 
24 Herring, America’s Longest War, 5-6. 
25 Vo Ngu Cheu, “The Other Side of the Vietnamese Revolution: The Empire of Viet-Nam (March—
August 1945)” The Journal of Asian Studies 45 (Feb 1986): 297-98, and Bui Minh Dūng, “Japan‟s Role in 
the Vietnamese Starvation of 1944-45” Modern Asian Studies 29 (July, 1995): 578.  The famine resulted 
when the government (first French, and then Japanese) seized rice crops for military and industrial use, 
and then worsened after severe weather. Between one and two million Vietnamese starved to death from 
late 1944 to the end of the war. 
26 John Springhall, “„Kicking out the Viet Minh‟: How Britain Allowed France to Reoccupy South 
Indochina, 1945-46,” Journal of Contemporary History 40 (January 2005): 117. 
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in Vietnamese politics, and did not provide the French with any help before leaving the 
country in fall 1945.27  
 The French expressed a powerful desire to regain their empire in the wake of 
World War II.  In the metropole, only the French communists opposed reestablishing the 
colonies.  France‟s national pride lay gravely wounded by the humiliations of the war, 
and the 4th Republic government saw the empire (soon renamed the French Union) as 
their sole remaining source of prestige.28 
 France returned to contest power in Indochina, and soon clashed with the Viet 
Minh, whose control in the north remained strong.  Negotiations between the two, in 
which the Viet Minh wanted independence and the French wanted to reassert full 
control, broke down.  In November 1946, the French navy bombarded the Tonkinese 
port of Haiphong and killed almost 6,000 Vietnamese civilians.  Viet Minh soldiers 
struck at French outposts throughout the country, especially in Tonkin, before beating a 
hasty retreat into the Indochinese interior.  The French Indochina War had begun.29 
 Despite air superiority and heavier firepower, the French struggled to defeat the 
Viet Minh, who adapted a strategy of Maoist revolutionary warfare and received 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 116-117. 
28 Martin Thomas, “French Imperial Reconstruction and the Development of the Indochina War, 1945-
1950,”  in The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis, eds., Mark Atwood Lawrence 
and Fredrik Logevall (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, 2007), 130-135. 
29 Herring, America’s Longest War, 6. The figure of 6,000 dead in Haiphong from France‟s naval shelling 
is a common figure.   
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logistical support from Communist China.30  Desperate shortages in reliable equipment 
and supplies hamstrung the French forces.  France‟s best potential benefactor, the United 
States, was initially unwilling to support French colonialism.  In the years before World 
War II, the US maintained an anti-colonial sentiment.  Until the very end of the 19th 
Century, the United States had not possessed colonies in the same way as European 
nations; this sentiment acknowledged the obvious colonial occupation of the Philippines, 
but emphasized America‟s “civilizing” influence there, and that the United States would 
soon leave that archipelago nation to its own devices.31  The “Open Door” Policy toward 
China, and Asia in general, at least appeared a liberal approach to empire, as it 
demanded open access to markets—open access that could, in theory, raise the living 
standards of Asians as well as Americans.32  
 Before and during World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt embodied this 
anti-colonial sentiment.  He wanted a strong China in command in Asia, and the old 
European colonial possessions—Burma, India, Korea, Malaysia, the Dutch Indies, and 
French Indochina—granted trusteeship status and helped into independence by the 
                                                 
30 Lawrence, Assuming the Burden, 277. 
31 Dixee R. Bartholomew-Feis, The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War Against Japan 
(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 82-83.  The American ideal of anti-colonialism was 
certainly not without an element of double-think.  The Philippines had been “won” from the Spanish, and 
American interventionism in the Caribbean and Latin America had a distinct imperial tone. 
32 William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), 6-7.  Gunboat diplomacy, extraterritoriality laws, and strict American restrictions 
on Asian immigration did much to undermine this positive image. 
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international community.33 Roosevelt vociferously expressed his anti-colonialism toward 
French Indochina, where his feelings about empires collided with his feelings about the 
French nation.  He concluded that even if a nation had the right to possess colonies, then 
the French had lost that right when the Germans overran them in 1940, and they caved to 
Japanese demands in 1940 and 1941.34  Roosevelt also argued that France had “failed” 
as colonizers in Indochina, stating that “France has had that country . . . for nearly one 
hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning . . .”35  
 During World War II, the Americans also conducted intelligence missions in 
Indochina, where they encountered the problems of European colonialism firsthand.  
Allied intelligence in the Pacific and China-Burma-India theaters kept Indochina under 
surveillance, as the Japanese based troops, aircraft, and ships there.  At first relying upon 
several effective, but ad hoc, sources in Indochina, the Allies were forced to look 
elsewhere when these sources were scattered by the 1945 Japanese coup.  The American 
Office of Strategic Services China branch looked to certain Vietnamese nationalist 
groups in Indochina for use as both intelligence gathers and pilot rescue; they found Ho 
Chi Minh and the Viet Minh, and employed them.  OSS personnel accompanied the Viet 
                                                 
33 John J. Sbrega, “The Anticolonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Reappraisal,” Political Science 
Quarterly 101, no. 1 (1986): 65-73. 
34 Gary R. Hess, “Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina,” The Journal of American History 59, no. 2 (1972): 
354. 
35 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 2: 1597.  The statement 
above appeared in a January 1945 memo from Roosevelt to Hull. 
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Minh when they marched in Hanoi after the surrender of the Viet Minh.36  Ho and his 
organization impressed the handful of Americans who met him, despite Ho‟s strong 
communist connections.37  
 Roosevelt‟s death and the start of the Cold War softened American anti-
colonialism.  Harry S. Truman, assuming the presidency after Roosevelt‟s death, faced a 
new political environment.  After the defeat of Germany in May 1945, no common 
enemy stood between the Western Allies and the Soviets, and tensions rose.  Hoping to 
keep the support of European allies, Washington moved to placate them by not forcing 
the issue of decolonization.38  France and Britain united on this issue; the British feared 
that French decolonization could lead to the loss of their own colonies, as well.39  
Though not in favor of France‟s return to power in Indochina, the US did nothing to 
prevent the move. 
 America‟s tone changed when China fell to Mao Zedong‟s communists in 1949 
and shifted further still with the outbreak of the Korean War.  Where before the United 
States saw France‟s war in Indochina as an imperialistic bush war, Americans now saw  
                                                 
36 Stein Tønnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution of 1945: Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh, and de Gaulle in a 
World at War (London: SAGE Publications, 1991), 310-312, and Ronald H. Spector, “Allied Intelligence 
in Indochina, 1943-1945.” The Pacific Historical Review 51, no. 1 (1982): 37. 
37 Archimedes L. Patti, Why Vietnam? Prelude to America’s Albatross (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1980), 83-87, and Tønnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution, 313-314. 
38 Hess, “Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina,” 365. 
39 Christopher Thorne, “Indochina and Anglo-American Relations, 1942-1945.” The Pacific Quarterly 
Review 45, no. 1 (1976): 83-85. 
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the struggle as another front in the global war against communism.  To American policy 
makers, the Viet Minh‟s communist connections—its bases of operation in Communist 
China, and the weapons it received from that nation—trumped its nationalist character.  
Though not in favor of French colonial control of Vietnam, the United States was 
determined to prevent communist expansion.40  US policy makers worried that if they 
did not support France in Indochina, the French might abandon Indochina to the 
communists, and oppose American interests in Europe.  Washington hoped that it could 
use military assistance as leverage to induce the French to grant autonomy to the 
Indochinese states, which American analysts considered the best course of action for the 
region.41  In 1950, the US agreed to support France‟s military effort in Indochina with 
military equipment and supplies, through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program 
(MDAP); the first shipments of supplies commenced in late summer. 42  The Military 
Assistance Advisory Group, Indochina (MAAG) deployed to French Indochina in 
September 1950, in order to monitor the equipment and supplies.  From 1950 to 1954, 
the United States spent more than $2 billion on the French war effort.43   
 MDAP and MAAG were both examples of a huge wave of American military  
                                                 
40 Thomas Anderson, The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 26. 
41 Statler, Replacing France, 19. 
42 Herring, America’s Longest War, 23. 
43  Herring, America’s Longest War, 44. 
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assistance abroad that began after World War II, as President Harry Truman moved to 
support American allies against internal and external communist aggression.  Military 
aid was a major aspect of the “Truman Doctrine” in 1947, which was to help defeat 
apparent communist aggression in Greece and Turkey.  By 1950, the Truman Doctrine 
had hardened into the more dogmatic National Security Council document NSC 68, 
which laid down American policy as containing communist expansion.44  Military aid, 
had as major a role in NSC 68 as it had in the Truman Doctrine.  Such aid had many 
appeals to American policymakers.  It could block Soviet expansion and prevent 
deployments of American soldiers abroad, provide a release valve for obsolete military 
equipment, and influence the policies of America‟s allies.45  When US shipments began 
arriving in French Indochina in 1950, the US had already sent supplies and advisors to 
Latin America, Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, and China, as well as most Western 
European countries.  This new, world-wide effort represented a sea change in American 
policy.  Never before, during peace time, had the United States provided foreign nations 
such levels of military aid.  American military advisors had rarely operated outside the 
western hemisphere, and never in such large numbers.   
France‟s military situation decayed in 1950, when Viet Minh offensives 
destroyed France‟s bases along the Chinese frontier.46  After a series of disasters, the 
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French finally turned the Viet Minh back in a large engagement at Vinh Yen, near 
Hanoi, in January 1951.47  The fighting stabilized afterwards: France boasted heavier 
weapons because of the influx of American equipment, and the Viet Minh had to make 
good their losses since 1950.  A relative stalemate continued.   
 The French employed an “oil slick” counter-guerilla strategy in Indochina, 
defending the region‟s lines of communication with small, static garrisons, and 
employed mobile reserves to search for, or respond to attacks by, the Viet Minh.48  
Though this strategy appeared good on paper—it could allow the French to defend all 
the vital regions, and still hunt down the Viet Minh—it benefited the Viet Minh‟s 
purposes, by pinning most of France‟s forces into static positions, where they could be 
bypassed or destroyed piecemeal.  Further, it put tremendous strain on those mobile 
reserves (groupement mobile, “mobile groups,” and paratroopers), as they perpetually 
moved from crisis to crisis.  These units suffered heavy losses in manpower and 
equipment. 
 Worse, the French strategy gave the Viet Minh the initiative in Indochina, and 
they used this advantage to choose when and where to fight battles.  Not as well armed 
as their French opponents, and totally without an air force or navy to speak of, the Viet  
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Minh made up for these shortcomings with their familiarity with the terrain, support of 
the local populace, and superior overland mobility.49  The Viet Minh could come from 
anywhere, at any time, it seemed; the French called it la guerre sans fronts, the war 
without fronts.50  These factors made it difficult for the French to employ their superior 
firepower.  In the main, the Viet Minh only fought battles when the advantage lay with 
them.  Despite modern vehicular and air transport, French mobility was limited by poor 
road conditions and shortages of transport aircraft.  This tethered French forces to the 
road network, where they were both unable to pursue the Viet Minh, and vulnerable to 
Viet Minh attack.  
 The war featured many large engagements, such as those fought at Cao Bang, 
Vinh Yen, Nan San, and Dien Bien Phu, but the vast majority of combat took place at 
the company and platoon level.  The French referred to the Viet Minh‟s endless 
ambushes, booby-traps, hit-and-run attacks, mortar barrages, and sniping as  the 
grignotage, “the slow gnawing away man by man, platoon by platoon.”51  The 
grignotage wore down French units until this attrition made them vulnerable to major 
attack.  The Viet Minh replicated this low level effect, where they overran platoons and 
companies, at the strategic level, where they first pinned the garrisons of an entire region 
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in place, destroyed the majority of them, and then crushed the subsequent French relief 
operation or counter-offensive through local numerical superiority and surprise.52  
 Frustrated by the Viet Minh‟s refusal to fight in a large, conventional 
engagement, the French established a fortified airfield far in north-western Tonkin, at 
Dien Bien Phu.  They hoped to replicate the successes France had enjoyed in previous 
large-scale engagements by drawing the Viet Minh into Dien Bien Phu‟s defenses, 
where they could be destroyed with artillery and air support.53  The Viet Minh obliged 
the French but, in an incredible logistical effort, crushed the strongpoints of Dien Bien 
Phu with devastating artillery fire, methodical siege tactics, and human wave assaults.  
President Dwight D. Eisenhower considered the use of immediate, and massive, US air 
support to save the garrison, but decided against this course of action.54  The physical 
destruction of many of France‟s best units (including most of its “fire brigade” parachute 
battalions), combined with the psychological damage inflicted by such a comprehensive 
defeat, drove France to negotiate.55  France and the Viet Minh came to a ceasefire  
agreement in Geneva, Switzerland shortly thereafter.  France granted Laos, Cambodia,  
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and the southern half of Vietnam their independence, and the northern half of Vietnam 
remained in the Viet Minh‟s hands.  France finally withdrew from South Vietnam in 
1956, as a result of increasing American political, military, and cultural influence in the 
newly-created South Vietnam.56 
 
MAAG’S ROLE IN FRENCH INDOCHINA 
 
 The United States‟ military mission in Indochina began with 70 men of all ranks 
in September 1950, and grew to 342 by the post-Dien Bien Phu ceasefire in 1954.57  
MAAG‟s mission in Indochina was to monitor the flow of MDAP-supplied US 
equipment, and to make sure that the equipment was used correctly by the French.  They 
assisted the French with specialist personnel and studied French logistical and combat 
operations, documenting their observations with monthly activity reports, estimates of 
French combat effectiveness, and MAAG operational notes.  From MAAG‟s 
establishment in September 1950 through the summer of 1952, command of MAAG fell 
under Brigadier General Francis G. Brink.  He was followed by Major General Thomas 
J. H. Trapnell, who remained MAAG Chief until April 1954, when he was replaced by  
Major General John W. O‟Daniel.  After O‟Daniel‟s departure in November 1955, 
command passed to Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams.  MAAG Chiefs reported to  
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the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), who was under the direction of the 
Department of the Navy.58  MAAG‟s reports were distributed to the Department of 
Defense, the US ambassador to Vietnam, and the chief of the MAAG mission to France, 
among others. 
 Most of the MAAG advisors‟ reports took a similar form.   An introduction 
provided a summary of the report‟s message and, often, figures of total MDAP 
equipment that had been delivered to Indochina during the month of that report‟s 
issuance. This was followed by specific reports by MAAG‟s Army, Navy, and Air Force 
personnel.  Each service-specific section summarized the actions of its respective 
MAAG personnel.  Significant in these documents are “end-use visits” (also referred to 
as “end item utilization visits”)—these described visits to French and French-allied units 
in the field made by MAAG personnel (in small teams of two to four men), and were 
primarily observations of how well, or poorly, the units maintained their MDAP-
supplied equipment.  The Americans also made status reports of these units, taking care 
to note operational readiness, morale, training, and even key personalities within the 
unit.  MAAG‟s monthly activity reports included anywhere from ten to thirty such end 
use visit reports, each of them dealing with an individual French  unit, and assigned it a 
simple (though vague) grade, ranging from poor to excellent.  Authors were usually 
unnamed in MAAG documents, and the exact strengths and composition of MAAG 
investigative teams unmentioned. 
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 MAAG reports discussed concrete issues, with statistics on supplies, combat 
missions, and so on, but also included assessments of overall French performance.  
Army, Navy, and Air Force officers alternately praised and criticized French and 
French-allied activities, on logistics, operations, and combat.  
 How much attention these reports received is, of course, open to conjecture. 
Their distribution lists fairly limited, and, in the years around American involvement in 
the French Indochina War (1949-1954), the U.S. military at large seemed uninterested in 
advisory missions in general, and Indochina and unconventional war in particular.  
Scholarly military journals and service publications gave little attention to these subjects.  
For example, from 1950 to 1954, the Command and General Staff College‟s Military 
Review’s only regular articles on Indochina were in its “Military Notes From Around the 
World” column, often reprinted from mainstream newspapers.  It only printed five 
articles on the French Indochina War, and their substance varied.  One was a four-page 
(with pictures) review of the French army in Indochina, emphasizing that the French 
were training their Vietnamese allies to help fight the Viet Minh.59  Two were  
summaries of Indochinese history, reprinted from foreign military journals.60  One was a 
State Department publication, emphasizing that Indochina‟s “right to freedom” was at 
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stake.61  Most critical of these articles was one by the academic and journalist Bernard 
Fall, who criticized the French for tactical “rigidity” and complacency.62   
 In the same period, the Air Force‟s Air University Quarterly Review published 
three articles.  One described USAF personnel helping to train pilots from nations 
receiving US material, mentioning Indochina only once.63  One article explained how 
Indochina‟s difficult terrain made the application of airpower challenging.64  The third 
described the use of air power against the Huks during their insurgency in the 
Philippines.65  
 In the period 1946-1951, the Navy‟s United States Naval Institute Proceedings 
made occasional mention of the fighting in French Indochina, and the French navy‟s 
mission there.  Most articles appeared in the “Notes on International Affairs” sections, 
and were reprints from other publications.  Those articles dealing with the French Navy 
in Indochina had vague overviews of the fighting there.66  The Navy‟s personnel digest  
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All Hands had virtually nothing to say about Indochina, and few things to note about 
MAAG duty in the period 1949-1955.  One 1953 article, in which MAAG missions were 
“good duty,” explained that a sailor  would “not be expected to attend a language school  
. . . To teach the languages to be encountered wherever MAAGs exist would involve 
teaching French, Spanish, Italian, Arabic, Chinese (several dialects), Greek, Portuguese, 
Flemish, German, Danish, Norwegian and perhaps even German or a Slovak dialect.  
This is not done because the host country is expected to supply interpreters.”67  Notably, 
Vietnamese is absent from this list. 
 The military‟s overall lack of interest in both Indochina and the type of warfare 
that raged there may have compromised the effectiveness of the MAAG mission from 
the start, as did a variety of other factors.  The dismissal of language skills for US 
personnel shown in All Hands manifested itself in Indochina.  A Monthly Activity 
Report from 1955 took note that no USAF personnel of MAAG even spoke French, let 
alone Vietnamese.68  Similar conditions existed in the Army and Navy sections.   
MAAG‟s small size meant that its personnel were inundated with work—the small 
number of personnel had to inspect and observe hundreds of French units in the field.  
These units were spread over thousands of square kilometers of difficult terrain, much of 
it in the north contested by the Viet Minh.  Simultaneously, MAAG had to monitor tens 
of thousands of tons of US materiel entering Indochinese ports and airfields.  For 
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example, in 1952, MAAG‟s 87 men managed the receipt of 94,823 tons of US-provided 
naval material delivered through MDAP, not to mention the 90,000-some tons of US 
equipment already in country from earlier MDAP shipments. MAAG‟s Army personnel 
were especially overworked, handling the overwhelming majority of that materiel.69  
MAAG was based in Saigon—though this put them in comparative safety (the Viet 
Minh was weak in the Mekong Delta) and in close proximity to the United States‟ 
civilian missions in Indochina, it also placed MAAG‟s headquarters far from the main 
fighting of the war, in Tonkin and Annam.  
Though the US military at large may have considered the war in Indochina, and 
MAAG missions in general, as less important than other regions and missions, the 
documents suggest that their authors believed that the war in Indochina was part of a 
greater struggle against communism.  Considering the Soviet and Communist Chinese 
origin of much of the Viet Minh‟s equipment, this was an understandable sentiment for 
the Americans.  However, such fervent belief that the Viet Minh were mere puppets of 
the Kremlin at times drove some members of MAAG to criticize their French 
counterparts more on hypothetical Sino-Soviet interventions than on the basis of the 
performance against the Viet Minh. 
Despite being overworked, undermanned, linguistically separated from the 
friendly forces they monitored and evaluated, and perhaps clouded by anti-communist 
sentiments, MAAG‟s personnel dutifully submitted their reports.  The following 
chapters examine the content of these reports. 
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                                                        CHAPTER III  
                                                       THE US ARMY 
 
 
 The US Army‟s reports on the French Army‟s performance in Indochina centered 
on French combat abilities and assessments of the French strategic position.  American 
Army personnel wrote with a tone of guarded optimism.  They frequently praised the 
combat abilities of French combat units (including colonial battalions from Africa) and 
found acceptable France‟s employment of American-provided equipment in Indochina.  
However, MAAG‟s Army representatives questioned the effectiveness of France‟s 
Indochinese allies, French strategic deployment, and what Americans described as a lack 
of offensive spirit in the French high command.  Overall, US Army personnel considered 
France‟s ground forces to be functioning as well as they could in difficult conditions, 
and attributed much of their success to the influx of US logistical support.  
 The French employed a combined-arms force in Indochina.  They deployed 
infantry, artillery, engineering, and armored units throughout the theater.  For most of 
the war, France‟s units remained at regimental-size or smaller.70  In addition to 
metropolitan French and native Indochinese troops (Cambodians, Laotians, Vietnamese, 
and Montagnards), France also used many of its colonial forces, especially from Africa.   
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Algerians, Moroccans, and Senegalese fought in many of the war‟s most ferocious 
battles, as did France‟s famous Foreign Legion.  Crack airborne battalions provided 
much of the army‟s offensive power, delivered to the battlefield by French Air Force 
transport planes.  
 Due to the difficulty of the terrain in Indochina, and the hit-and-run guerrilla 
tactics often employed by the Viet Minh, France relied heavily upon its infantry.  In 
1952, France had  420,000 troops in the field, including approximately 200 battalions of 
infantry (10 airborne), and used most of these as static garrisons for key towns and other 
critical communication points.  The army was France‟s largest force in Indochina—in 
the same year, there were 12,000 men in the Navy in Indochina, and 7,440 trained 
personnel in the Air Force.71  
 From 1950-1956, MAAG‟s Army section consisted of around fifteen officers and 
forty enlisted men.72  This small team faced some daunting assignments.  Not only were 
they to observe and grade French units in the field, spread over the huge square mileage 
of the Red River Delta and the Tonkinese and Central Highlands, they were also to 
monitor and catalog the tens of thousands of tons of war materiel arriving monthly in 
Indochina. The French Army consumed the lion‟s share of the overall US support for 
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France in Indochina.  Thought most of the US equipment was of World War II vintage, 
it remained serviceable and effective.73  A report published in February 1952 showed 
that, up to that point the war, the US had delivered  to the French 418 combat vehicles 
(primarily halftracks, armored cars, and light tanks), 3,488 transport vehicles (trucks and 
jeeps), 7,783 automatic weapons, 3,527 radios, nearly 800,000 artillery shells, and 
18,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition.74 An Army document from December 
reported that eleven transport ships carrying supplies had arrived in that month, 
delivering 6,796 long tons of supplies for the French war effort, 6,235 of them for the 
army.  Included in this haul, among many other items, were sixty-six armored cars, 245 
two-and-a-half ton trucks (the famous “deuce and a half”), 1,213 heavy machine guns, 
5,000 carbines, 92,000 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition, and 530 kits for the 
treatment of snakebites.  For 1952 entire, 81,187 of the 94,823 tons of supplies delivered 
to Indochina by the United States had been for the French Army, with the remaining 
tonnage going to the French Air Force and Navy.75  A delivery from early 1953 featured 
14,000 colored smoke grenades and 10,000 parachutes.76  Revealing the increasing rate 
of US support, 18,184 tons were delivered in March 1953, roughly three times the 
tonnage delivered in December 1952.77 
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The most important detail of France‟s army in Indochina was the uneven quality 
of its two constituent parts.  “French” units included metropolitan troops (many of them 
parachute, mechanized, or artillery) as well as France‟s colonial troops, included among 
them Algerians, Moroccans, Senegalese, and the Foreign Legion.  In fact, US Army 
reports labeled many units “French”, if such distinction was unclear, as it may have been 
for many of the African units.  To confuse matters further, most “French” units in 
Indochina included large numbers of Indochinese, serving as either replacements for 
casualties or as non-combat support personnel.  Some units had a counter-intuitive 
composition: the 1st Battalion of the Moroccan Artillery Regiment (1/RACM) apparently 
fielded no Moroccans, as MAAG documented its strength as one-third French and two-
thirds Vietnamese.78  The Americans considered the 3rd Amphibian Squadron “French,” 
with its enlisted men were “native” and its officers French.79  As a rule, French units 
performed well on the battlefield, with dependable morale and at least adequate training 
and equipment.  Some units, such as the parachute battalions, had impressive combat 
records.  The Indochinese, or Associated States component of the French army included 
Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese troops.  Though the Indochinese did field some 
excellent units, including several crack parachute battalions, others performed poorly.  
MAAG‟s US Army personnel had a varied assessment of France‟s army in Indochina, 
mainly due to the uneven quality of the forces the French employed.   
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 MAAG‟s US Army personnel had high opinions of French units and personnel.  
French soldiers, deployed from France or elsewhere in the colonies, could expect a 
twenty-four month tour in Indochina; many saw their tours extended to twenty-seven 
months.80 The Americans praised French combat officers.  A summarizing document of 
France‟s field effectiveness from 1953 described the average French officer, up to the 
level of battalion, as “excellent.  He is well trained in French schools and possesses a 
great deal of personal courage.  Many officers up to company grade are serving their 
second tour of duty in the Indochina theater and as a result know their job well.”81  The 
same report called French morale “good.”  It referred to French engineers as 
“exceptionally good at field expedients,” French gunners “good artillery men,” and 
medical personnel “excellent.”82  French units performed well in the field.83 
 A major task of MAAG personnel was the inspection of equipment provided to 
the French by the United States.  These “end use visits” gave detailed examinations of 
the state of American gear and weapons in the hands of French and French-allied 
personnel, and, in many cases, also provided an overview of the unit‟s morale and 
overall quality.  The Americans found that the French handled their US-issued 
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equipment well.  As early as December 1950, “It was noted that a considerable 
improvement in the appearance of the units was evident since the inspections made 
during September.”84  A brief examination of end-use visits from 1952 to 1954 gives the 
flavor of these reports.   
 In December 1952, US Army personnel visited seventeen French and 
Indochinese units in the field.  The Americans graded all but one of them as 
“satisfactory” or better; they cited the one “unsatisfactory” unit visited as having let its 
vehicles succumb to “general disrepair.”  The Americans praised one French unit for 
excellent equipment maintenance even though the unit had been “subjected to almost 
continuous and hard service.”  They rated one battalion of Cambodian infantry as 
“excellent,” their good morale and extensive experience “reflected in the manner in 
which they cared for their equipment.”  An engineer unit visited had “excellent working 
facilities,” and, in proof of their skill at field expedients, fabricated otherwise 
unavailable materials.  A unit of Moroccan Spahis had armored cars in “excellent 
condition,” though the Americans did observe that the vehicles did not display their 
MDAP markings. 85   
 In January 1953, US Army MAAG personnel visited thirteen units, and found 
every one of them at least satisfactory in equipment maintenance, weapons and gear 
suffering merely from “minor discrepancies” like mold on binocular lenses.  The report 
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complimented several Vietnamese units for maintaining their equipment well despite 
enemy pressure.86 
  A Monthly Activity Report from April 1953 stated that “MDAP equipment was 
found to be maintained an acceptable manner although the overall standard was 
somewhat lower than that desired.  Equipment on hand in all units visited will enable 
those units to perform their assigned missions in an excellent manner. ” The document 
praised the combat abilities of several units and officers.  It also included assessments of 
French ammunition depots, most of which the Americans found to be in good condition, 
aside from shortages of lightning rods.  The Americans considered one depot highly 
susceptible to fire were it to be damaged by an accident or enemy attack. 87 
 In January 1954, Army personnel visited twenty-four units, and they rated most 
of them “good” or better.  Again, they found only “minor discrepancies.”  Further, the 
report praised the “noticeably effective” maintenance effort made by the French Union, 
with their January report ratings “exceeding those during any previous period thus far 
reported.” 88  
 American reports made frequent note of the French logistical system‟s 
shortcomings.  A December 1953 document commented that despite “visits and 
discussions” with French commanders, ammunition storage facilities were poor.  The 
author observed that, due to manpower shortages, “coolies” and communist prisoners 
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handled ammunition, instead of qualified soldiers.89  “By U. S. standards,” another 
report read, “their supply system is slow and inefficient.  Maintenance problems are 
increased by a lack of trained mechanics and limited facilities.  Much could be done to 
increase the efficiency of both the support units but also combat units by the setting up 
of a good system for command inspections and staff supervision.”90  
 The Americans did not consider all of the problems the fault of the French.  
Some of MAAG‟s US Army personnel blamed the problem on the MDAP equipment.  
Many reports made the distinction between new and “rebuilt” MDAP equipment—much 
of the equipment fell into the latter category, making it more susceptible to wear and 
tear.  MDAP failed to respond for requests on cleaning agents for artillery bores, forcing 
many Vietnamese units to use kerosene in the interim. 91  Floods in Japan, where many 
of the supplies either originated or passed through before continuing to Indochina, could 
damage ammunition.92  Dry cell batteries, for use in man-portable field radios, suffered 
from shocking failure rates as MDAP failed to “tropicalize” them.  Half of one 
Vietnamese battalion‟s dry cell batteries were faulty and inoperable.93  A report from 
September 1953 estimated that, in one month, MDAP delivered 26,000 unusable dry cell 
batteries out of total of the 28,000, a staggering failure rate of almost 93 percent. 94  
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 Indochinese terrain also hampered French logistics.  Flooding in Tonkin made it 
difficult to waterproof ammunition dumps.  The primitive transportation system 
damaged many vehicles.  A December 1953 end-use visit commented that many French 
units suffered from high shock-absorber “attrition” due to rough road conditions.95  
Another mentioned dirty roads “only sufficient to support one way traffic.” 96  These 
accelerated wear-and-tear on vehicles, slowed down vehicular movement, created traffic 
jams, and made the vehicles more vulnerable to Viet Minh attack.  
 Thus, US Army observers did admit that other issues influenced French logistical 
problems.  One report, praising several French and Indochinese units for their level of 
maintenance, made clear that the French made effective use of their MDAP gear, and 
that despite a “decrease in spit and polish,” there was “no serious or widespread 
lessening of emphasis on maintenance .  .  .  ”97 Another report, from January 1953, 
made the practical observation that France‟s logistical system in Indochina did function, 
as “evident by their ability to keep their fighting units in action.”98 
 The Indochinese contingent of the French army—the Associated States forces—
did not fare so well in American eyes.  One Vietnamese battalion‟s shortcomings were 
enough that Colonel Norman Williams, Chief of MAAG‟s Army Section in March 1953, 
attached a memorandum to the Monthly Activity Report, saying that the maintenance of 
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the battalion‟s equipment was “falling far below the desired standard.”  He cited rusty 
and dirty mortar barrels and unserviceable vehicles. 99  Another Vietnamese battalion, 
though it did better in the Monthly Activity Report, suffered from an inadequate 
commander, rusty weapons, and poorly oiled vehicles; the end-use visit added that the 
unit would be soon revisited for a reassessment.100  In December 1953, MAAG rated the 
29th Vietnamese Infantry Battalion as “poor,” as it had “little or no emphasis” on 
maintenance.  The commander of another Vietnamese unit, cited in the same document, 
lacked interested in the condition of his battalion, whose vehicles suffered a mechanical 
failure rate of 30 percent.101  Perhaps most damning of these, a report filed in May 1953 
criticized the 6th Vietnamese Infantry Battalion, stationed outside Hanoi.  In “bad 
shape,” the unit had not even begun routine maintenance on their weapons, despite an 
impending operation against the Viet Minh.  The list of deficiencies continued:  
. . . the Battalion Commander had not inspected nor was he familiar with 
the condition of his equipment, and offered numerous invalid excuses for 
his negligence; neither the Sub-Sector or Zone Commander, nor their 
representatives had any time conducted any inspection of this unit; the 
majority of the personnel were sleeping or resting on the day of 
inspection .  .  .  Battalion, Sub-Sector, and Zone Commanders, without 
exception, attempted to excuse condition of the equipment and steadfastly 
maintained that the 6th Battalion was one of the best in the Vietnamese 
National Army. 102 
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 The Americans did not judge all Indochinese units so harshly.   An end-use visit 
from April of that year rated a Vietnamese infantry battalion as “excellent,” with 
responsible officers quite familiar with the state of their units‟ equipment and personnel; 
it gave a Vietnamese signal company the same rating, praising its storage of weapons 
and radio gear.103  An observation of a Vietnamese mountain battalion in 1953 claimed 
their esprit d‟corps to be “excellent.”104  A December 1953 report found the 1st 
Vietnamese Artillery Battalion to be superb condition.  Its personnel appeared “well 
qualified,” its equipment was maintained “in an excellent manner.”  Overall, the unit 
compared “favorably with a similar U. S. Army unit.”105 Airborne units received special 
praise.  The 1st Vietnamese Parachute Battalion extended “maximum” cooperation 
during its inspection, and had high morale and well-maintained gear.  The 3rd 
Vietnamese Parachute Battalion received a similar rating, with high praise in morale, 
training, officers, and equipment maintenance.106 
 MAAG also found other Indochinese units to be in good condition.  Cambodians 
appeared popular with American observers.  A January 1954 report included 
assessments of several Cambodian units, and described several of them having 
equipment in “good condition” due to their “excellent maintenance.”107  One report 
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wrote of them as “stronger physically” than Vietnamese.  A “French” battalion inspected 
by MAAG consisted of all Cambodian troops, except for the French officers; its “combat 
effectiveness was as good as a [Foreign] Legion battalion.”108 
 Though the Americans considered some Indochinese units praiseworthy, many 
others were not.  “All the [8th Vietnamese] mountain battalion‟s ranks are filled with 
local tribesman [sic],” wrote one American soldier.  “They are smaller in stature and 
inferior in intelligence, ability, and physical stamina, to the Vietnamese .  .  .  Even those 
who have succeeded in getting a commission revert to their former habits and primitive 
customs when the opportunity arises.”109  According to one US Army soldier, the men of 
the 40th Vietnamese Infantry Battalion needed “expert supervision.”110 
 American observers suggested a variety of causes for the overall inferiority of the 
Indochinese units. Unlike French troops, who trained before deployment to Indochina, 
Indochinese soldiers did much of their training after they were assigned to their unit.  
This in and of itself may not have been a significant problem, but Indochinese units had 
no standards of training, so the quality and duration of training soldiers received was 
uneven.111 
 In addition to training, US Army personnel saw weaknesses with Indochinese 
officers, especially in field experience and their absence from the higher echelons of 
                                                 
108 Field Estimate, January 1953, box 1, SCGR, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
109 MMAR December 1953, box 1, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
110 MMAR July 1954, box 1, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
111 Field Estimate, January 1953, box 1, SCGR, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
 39 
command in Indochina.  The problems did not always arise from the quality of the 
officers themselves, as shown in earlier examples.  One report noted that “The officers 
of the Associated States Forces are considered by the French to be excellent at company 
grade level .  .  .  one Vietnamese mobile group (similar to a US RCT[regimental combat 
team]) and several battalions completely officered by Vietnamese, gave an excellent 
account of themselves.”112  Many Indochinese officers in trained at in-country schools 
staffed by capable French commissioned and noncommissioned officers.   
 The greater criticism leveled by the Americans was that the French blocked 
Indochinese officers higher command. One American observed a “noticeable” shortage 
of Indochinese field grade (major and above) and staff officers. 113  The lack of 
Indochinese officers in the French high command meant that, though the Americans 
urged the French to allow the Indochinese greater military autonomy, Indochinese forces 
could not function in the field without the French directly supporting and leading them.  
One 1952 report commented, “The Vietnamese are eager to assume more of the high 
command functions in the native army.  However, the French feel that most of the native 
officers above battalion level are not sufficiently qualified to command independently 
and as a result there is some friction on this point.”114  The Americans worried that, with 
so little experience in leading themselves in major operations, the Vietnamese might be 
incapable of doing so if they ever gained control of their own army. 
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 The shortcomings of Indochinese units, including inadequate training, poor 
maintenance standards, and inexperienced Indochinese officers, resulted in reduced 
combat effectiveness.  One Army estimate found that, in terms of firepower, many 
Indochinese units had weaponry that made them nearly equal to US units of equivalent 
size, but this firepower did not translate into an equivalent combat effectiveness, in part 
because Indochinese units lacked training as cohesive units.115  Most of the units poorly 
rated by MAAG were static defensive units.  Split up into small garrisons of platoon or 
company size, these units not only lacked experience moving in large formations, their 
morale fell as boredom and lethargy set upon their isolated jungle outposts.  
 These problems multiplied after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, as the Vietnamese 
army increased in size.  Struggling to train the Vietnamese, another MAAG report cited 
a lack of technical and logistical skills and shortages of experienced leadership as just a 
few of the problems besetting the Vietnamese Army.116  The move to reorganize the 
Vietnamese Army into infantry divisions added to the difficulty, as did the semi-
autonomy of military units controlled by dissident sects.117  Also troubling the 
Vietnamese was that much of their equipment had been handed down to them by 
withdrawing French troops who had not properly maintained the equipment after the 
ceasefire.118 
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 As Vietnamese troops took a much more prominent role after the cease fire in 
1954, the Americans encountered a variety of problems stemming from the Vietnamese‟ 
inexperience in handling large formations.  Reports from the early days of the 
Vietnamese army spelled doom and gloom for the Vietnamese.  A US Army training 
visit in early 1956 found the 12th Light Infantry Division suffering from low morale due 
to poor pay, lack of water, and limited medical care, all stemming from the division‟s 
inadequate logistics and administration.  Their low morale made them “susceptible” to 
Viet Minh propaganda, the effects of which the US Army author attributed their high 
desertion rate.  Poor lines of communication, a lack of a rifle range, and a “weak” 
division commander added to their difficulty.119  A May 1956 report recommended that 
“the 13th Division be relieved from its present mission and concentrated at either its 
home station or other suitable location to undergo an intensive training mission.”  The 
same document suggested that the 15th Division, which could not “be counted as a 
trained, effective fighting force” led by a division commander who appeared “weak and 
unsure of himself” also be returned to its “home station” and retrain. 120 
 In addition to training and morale problems, the Americans saw severe logistical 
issues for the new Vietnamese army.  Of the 3d Field Division‟s 700 vehicles, US Army 
advisors found that only “26% are serviceable” and estimated that “95% [of 
communication equipment] is in need of repair.  .  .  .  Supply procedures are poorly 
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organized.”121  The schools where Vietnamese mechanics learned to repair vehicles 
fared little better: “The failure of ARVN to inaugurate this [vehicle maintenance] school 
is a prime contributing factor to the unsatisfactory state of vehicle maintenance in the 
Vietnamese Army.”122 
 Vietnamese troops also had reason to doubt the effectiveness of their 
ammunition, as one scathing report indicated of the 703d Ordnance Ammunition 
Company: 
[The 703d] has the worst depot storage area seen to date.  Entirely 
unsatisfactory.  The area floods to a depth of two feet during the rainy 
season.  Because of this the bottom rows of ammunition stock piles have 
been declared unserviceable.  Most of the ammunition is stored in the 
open and incorrectly stacked, and unprotected from the elements.  Stocks 
are just jammed in anywhere they will fit.  .  .  . Lack of technical 
knowledge of ammunition emphasized by used of live 105 how[itzer] 
ammunition as a decoration. 123 
 
 In the aftermath of Dien Bien Phu, the US appraisal of the Vietnamese Army 
bore similarity to the overall American appraisal of the Associated States units in early 
1953.  This assessment predicted that the French-allied Indochinese armies, without 
French support, would be “incapable” of defeating the Viet Minh, let alone a Chinese 
invasion.  The report insisted that “successful conclusion” could only be reached by 
improving the indigenous forces of Indochina.124  
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 Aside from the problems of Indochinese units, and the greater problems with the 
post-1954 Vietnamese Army, US Army observers disapproved of French strategic 
deployment.  In order to cover the considerable land area of Indochina, the French 
subdivided their units and spread them over a wide area.  Thus, battalions split into 
company- and platoon-sized posts, and rarely operated as whole units.  “It appears 
certain,” a 1953 document asserted, “that if a reorganization were effected [sic] and 
larger standardized tactical units formed, i.e., regiments, divisions, artillery battalions, 
tank battalions, etc. , the overall efficiency [of the French army] would be increased.”125  
In addition to dispersed deployment, the Americans also felt uncomfortable with the ad 
hoc orders of battle favored by the French.  “[Organization] is an outstanding weakness 
of the French Union forces in Indochina,” said one report.  French commanders 
organized their units “to fit a situation rather than organized as standard type units and 
then tailored to fit the situation.”126 
 This problem of dispersed units spread to the Vietnamese forces.  For their 
nascent army, the problem not only watered down combat power, it also made training 
more difficult. The “ARVN must be convinced that it is essential to maintain unit 
integrity in order to develop trained, effective divisions,” one training visit summary 
read. 127 
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 The Army observers were even more troubled by what they perceived as a lack 
of aggressiveness in the French high command.  The Americans saw the French of as 
being trapped in “defensive strong points” instead going out into the bush, where they 
could “fight the Viet Minh on grounds chosen by the French.”128  A May 1953 report 
pointed toward dispersed French units and asserted that “the war in Indo-China is waged 
on a defensive concept with only limited objective attacks being made.”129  The 
Americans believed that French and Indochinese morale could only hold for so long, and 
that launching a significant offensive could improve morale.  The Americans saw a lack 
of offensive spirit in the French high command as one of the main hindrances to success 
in Indochina.  “It appears that the French command is satisfied to organize strong 
points,” one report observed.  A “lack of aggressive spirit” prevented the French from 
going on the offensive to “keep the Vietminh off balance.”130 Going on the offensive 
could also mitigate domestic problems in France: if the stalemated military situation 
“continued for a prolonged period,” it would “undermine both civilian and military 
morale in Indo-China.”131 
 Some of this disapproval of France‟s “offensive spirit” may have been due to the 
American Army‟s World War II experiences.  The huge campaigns fought by the Army 
in North Africa, Europe, and the Pacific had made the US Army accustomed to 
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conventional battles; through the late 1940s, the Army trained with World War II 
weapons in preparation to fight World War II battles.132  The fluid nature France‟s war 
in Indochina did not fit the model created in Italy, Normandy, or the South West Pacific.  
Despite the Viet Minh‟s ability to strike the French when and where they chose, the 
road-bound nature of the French army and the way that this restricted movement 
exposed them to Viet Minh ambushes, and the ability of the Viet Minh to withdraw into 
either the civilian population or the jungle with frustrating ease, MAAG‟s Army 
representatives could only suggest that the French build more “offensive spirit.”   
 American observers sometimes admitted that conditions outside the French 
Army‟s control added to their difficulties in Indochina.  The same report related above 
remarked that, in the critical Tonkin region, the French had the narrowest of advantages 
in manpower (inadequate to support a major offensive operation), and that the French 
had no choice but to commit a considerable portion of its strength to static garrison duty.  
The document also considered the many difficulties that the limited Indochinese road net 
presented to the French.133 
 Some Army observers argued that the French held on because of the equipment 
granted to them by the United States.  According to one: “Prior to August 1950, French 
Union Forces in Indo-China were poorly equipped.  .   .   .  Particularly lacking were 
motor vehicles, radios, artillery weapons, modern automatic weapons, combat vehicles, 
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ammunition and spare parts.”134  French and Indochinese maintenance discipline 
improved, as the Americans saw it, because of the “salutary effect of the MAAG 
inspections.”  Not only did these inspections improve maintenance practices—they also 
encouraged native troops to take “considerable pride” in their weapons and 
equipment.135 
 US Army reports declared that the influx of supplies improved the combat 
effectiveness of French units.  “Better communications, made possible by the delivery of 
more adequate signal equipment, has improved combat control.”  Despite the famous 
defeats of French motorized groups in the highlands of Vietnam, this same summary 
praised the new vehicles available for the French as having “greatly increased the 
mobility of the French Union Forces and made possible the use of a greater number of 
mobile striking forces so essential to combat conditions in Indo-China.”  All this, the 
Americans asserted, contributed to improved morale.136  
 MAAG‟s Army personnel had mixed impressions of France‟s army in Indochina.  
French troops and officers, including those forces from Africa, were professional and 
made fine soldiers.  Indochinese units and commanders, when given proper training and 
equipment, could also make fine soldiers—though the US Army personnel in MAAG 
concluded that the French had shortchanged the Indochinese in this regard.  They 
acknowledged French difficulties in Indochina--the terrain, poor roads, and France‟s 
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limited manpower—but, at the same time, criticized the French for slipping into a 
passive, defensive footing.   
Overall, then, MAAG‟s US Army representatives considered the French army in 
Indochina to be in a fair condition, especially with the supplies, equipment, and weapons 
provided to them by the United States.  Their view was positive, and reflected the 
reasoning behind military assistance as described by historian Chester Pach and others, 
that the “giving of military aid more important than the specific purposes to which the 
aid was put.”137 The US Air Force and Navy, however, came to less positive conclusions 
than their Army colleagues. 
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                                                         CHAPTER IV 
                                          THE US AIR FORCE AND NAVY 
 
 
 In contrast to the Army‟s positive views, MAAG‟s Air Force and Navy personnel 
held, with exceptions, negative views of France‟s small air force and navy (FAF and 
FRN, respectively) in Indochina.  The Air Force section of MAAG endlessly repeated 
their grievances against the FAF—the FAF had low logistical standards, resisted 
American maintenance methods, and had limited combat value.  MAAG‟s Navy 
personnel also leveled criticism against the FRN for logistical shortcomings.  Though 
each MAAG party had a generally negative view of their French counterparts, the Navy 
produced a much smaller body of documents, making analysis of their opinions and 
activities much more difficult than that of the Air Force.  Significantly, USN writers 
complimented the FRN‟s riverine capabilities, but seemed uninterested in investigating 
these units, possibly as a result of the USN‟s doctrinal leanings toward large, “blue-
water” forces. 
 Thus, this chapter is subdivided between the two services, first explaining the 
observations and apparent opinions of MAAG‟s Air Force and Navy sections.  Each 
section will also describe the French services in question.  
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THE AIR FORCE 
 
 MAAG‟s USAF personnel frequently criticized the capabilities of their French 
counterparts, so much so that the USAF sections of MAAG‟s Monthly Activity Reports 
often included a subheading entitled “Impediments to Progress,” in which the USAF 
authors listed their most recent criticisms, sometimes in frank language.  These centered 
on three factors: the FAF‟s lax maintenance and logistical standards; France‟s apparent 
reluctance to help train members of the Vietnamese Air Force; and the FAF‟s limited 
tactical abilities.  USAF personnel argued that these problems originated from French 
operational inexperience, critical personnel shortages, and arrogance.  Some of USAF‟s 
criticisms may have come from that service‟s doctrine of large-scale, strategic bombing 
campaigns.  The USAF observers seldom complimented the FAF, and when they did, 
their compliments were contrary to the many complaints and criticisms already leveled 
by the American airmen.  The Americans of MAAG‟s USAF branch laid some of the 
blame outside of the FAF—principally on MDAP for supply delivery problems—but the 
FAF itself received most of the disapproval.   
 Commitments to NATO and laws restricting the deployment of draftees overseas 
limited the FAF‟s personnel strength in Indochina.138  In February 1952, its manpower 
strength was 7,440 air force personnel (meaning those with specific, technical training in 
flying, maintenance, or the strategic and tactical direction of aircraft), 303 of them pilots.  
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Pilots and aircrew stayed in Indochina for tours of eighteen months, ground-personnel 
for twenty-seven.139 The FAF only marginally increased in size as the war went on.  By 
January 1954, for example, the FAF had (according to MAAG) increased in total size to 
7,882 personnel, compared to the 7,440 in 1952, an addition of 442 men.140  By August 
of that year, the FAF‟s strength had grown again to 8,027.  Critically, at that late stage of 
France‟s involvement in Indochina, the FAF included 418 pilots.141  The FAF made use 
of indigenous personnel to act as guards and general labor on their airbases; in January 
1954, the French employed 3,112 of these “indigs.”142  However, these personnel had no 
technical qualifications, and could not contribute to the FAF‟s severe shortage of 
maintenance personnel.  Because of the FAF‟s limited manpower, they could only put a 
small number of planes into the sky at any given time, regardless of what the United 
States desired to provide them. 
 The FAF in Indochina flew mostly American aircraft.  One USAF author, writing 
in 1954, commented that the “overwhelming portion of the material in use in the French 
Air Force, Extreme Orient, has been furnished by MDAP funds. With the exception of a 
few obsolete liaison aircraft, the FAF is currently using only USAF type aircraft and 
munitions . . . ”143  Another MAAG account listed the number of aircraft so far supplied 
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by the US, and included 190 single-engine fighters, 49 twin-engine bombers, and 32 C-
47 transport aircraft, all of World War II vintage.144  The French used their American-
made fighters (F-8F Bearcat interceptors), exclusively for tactical support, as the Viet 
Minh possessed no aircraft of their own.  Though they performed this task well, they had 
shortcomings as attack aircraft.  The F-8F‟s had a short operational range, preventing 
them from operating for extended periods of time in or near Laos (a shortcoming that 
proved critical during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu).  The FAF‟s twin-engine bombers, 
the B-26 Invader (originally the A-26) had excellent range and payload, but were only 
available in limited numbers.  The French used C-47 Dakotas for airborne and resupply 
operations.  It was a rugged, dependable plane, but, again, the French lacked both 
numbers of aircraft and the pilots to fly them.145  This was a small air force indeed.  As a 
matter of comparison, some 600 B-29s bombed Japan daily at the height of the 
American air campaign against that country in 1945,  thousand-plane raids against 
Germany were not uncommon, where the various bomber groups could deploy more 
than 5,000 B-17s and B-24s.146   
 Rather than focusing on the small size of the FAF, many MAAG documents 
noted the US Air Force‟s dissatisfaction with the FAF‟s maintenance standards and 
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logistical practices.  One 1955 document reported that in “a visit to the units at Cap St. 
Jacques [a French airbase], it was very noticeable how lax and disorderly the 
maintenance was in comparison to USAF standards.”147  A 1953 Monthly Activity 
Report included a litany of criticisms for the French, citing ammunition storage issues at 
a FAF base.  The French neither stacked ammunition properly nor provided it with 
dunnage.  They stored the ordnance too close to other structures, and did not provide the 
ammunition facilities with adequate drainage. USAF personnel even witnessed ground 
crews carelessly handle bombs.148  
 These issues all stemmed from the USAF assertion that FAF followed inferior 
maintenance standards to those of the USAF.  “Supply discipline is lacking,” reported 
one document from September 1954.  “Methods employed are cumbersome, antiquated, 
and overextended through decentralization.” 149  One February 1952 piece summarized, 
“The supply and maintenance functions of the French Air Force are not also not up to 
USAF standards. The lack of qualified personnel and poor maintenance practices 
contribute greatly to the reduced effectiveness which no amount of logistical support can 
overcome.”150  One estimate found that the French managed about twenty-five flight 
hours per month per aircraft. The USAF, with similar types of aircraft, had and could 
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manage seventy five hours.151 Another estimate put average French flight hours per 
aircraft at half that of the USAF.152 These comparisons showed, to MAAG reporters, that 
the FAF was a much less efficient air force than the USAF. 
 Americans attributed some of the problem to French attitudes.  One report, after 
urging that the French should embrace preventative maintenance, and apply USAF 
training and supply practices, lamented that the Americans were “attempting” to train the 
French in US administrative techniques, but that the French resisted: “Training in all 
phases of Air Force functions should be, but is not being, conducted.”153  A frustrated 
airman in 1955 wrote, “The problem is summarized simply: Fully qualified MAAG 
representatives say to the French, „We believe you can repair with your existing facilities 
and manpower items that have not been attempted.‟  The French may say, „No, we 
can‟t.‟  An impasse immediately arises. . . .”154  American personnel were not shy in 
laying the blame, either.  A 1953 document considered that the problems of the French 
Air Force in Indochina—especially those of a logistical nature—“must be attributed 
directly to the French Air Force” and its “lack of aggressive attitudes to correct 
[administrative] malpractices.”155  A January 1954 report used almost the same phrasing 
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to describe the problem: a “lack of an aggressive attitude to correct their malpractices . . . 
Has a terrific bearing on supply support problems.”156 
 After the negotiations that followed the Viet Minh‟s crushing victory at Dien 
Bien Phu in spring of 1954, the FAF‟s slip-shod maintenance and supply system 
suffered a total collapse. The United States had ceased its support of French operations 
in Indochina in July 1954 as a result of the ceasefire agreement.157  The lack of fresh 
aircraft and replacement parts combined with the logistical problems USAF observers 
had long documented, and USAF personnel declared, as early as August 1954, that the 
FAF had suffered a “complete breakdown of combat capabilities since the ceasefire and 
stopping of supplies from the United States” and worried, if fighting broke out again, the 
French would be unable to hold their positions.158  This same document made sure to 
mention that “This MAAG has continually emphasized to the French that under the . . . 
policy of the United States, Indo China was to become self-sufficient after FY 55 . . .” 
and that the FAF‟s collapse was due to “the reluctance of the French to except [sic] this 
advise.”159  Even simple communications proved difficult: “There are instances,” a 
MAAG airman wrote in May 1955, “of correspondence taking ten to fourteen days to 
travel a distance of less than two (2) miles.”160 
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 The French did not respond to USAF complaints, perhaps because their 
discombobulated logistical system prevented an effective response.  An American report 
from February 1955 commented on numerous French inadequacies: “[The FAF base at 
Bien Hoa still suffers from] conditions . . . that were recommended for correction in June 
1954. . . . Recommendations for establishing assembly line techniques for repair, as 
practiced by USAF . . . are still unheeded . . . Skilled technicians and/or repairmen are 
not effectively utilized. . . .”161 One American assessment hoped that the lack of fresh 
replacement equipment from the United States would force the French to efficiently use 
what they had on hand. That same report suggested that the French be allowed supplies 
in the future with specific conditions: that Americans be in charge of the handling of 
shipments to ensure proper records, US accounting procedures be used, and programs be 
developed to exploit indigenous (i.e., Vietnamese) capabilities.162 
 This issue of training “indigenous” personnel became quite important after the 
ceasefire in 1954, when both France and the US moved to reinforce the militaries of the 
Associated States.  USAF personnel criticized the FAF for failures to support the new 
Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).  As with the French, the US centered its disapproval on 
supply and maintenance issues, accusing the French of failure to train the Vietnamese in 
aircraft service and logistical procedures.  
 The criticisms started well before the cease-fire. One such accusation, though 
subtle, appeared in a January 1954 report, where the USAF author tabulated FAF 
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personnel strength in Indochina.  He included totals of pilots, aircrew, 
administrative/technical personnel, and non-technical personnel and emphasized that the 
number of “Vietnamese OJT [On-the-Job-Training] in FAF [was] 0.”163  
 Other documents summarized the problems with less subtlety.  A September 
1954 report listed a variety of French shortcomings: “Indigenous industry possessed with 
a current technical „know-how‟ is for all practical purposes non-existent in the fields of 
aircraft and/or aircraft engine overhaul or repair.”  This rendered the Vietnamese 
mechanics on both FAF and VNAF air bases “copyists” rather than competent and 
independent mechanics.  “It would appear through informal discussion that the FAF has 
little or no interest in developing the latent potential that must certainly exist within the 
mechanically mind but unexploited indigenous personnel.” 164  In May 1955, another 
airman wrote that the French Air Force displayed a “lack of appreciation for this 
indigenous potential.”  Referring to the French as “lethargic,” “complacent,” and 
“reluctant,” he accused them of failing to take advantage of “mechanically minded 
Vietnamese.”  These mechanically-oriented indigenous personnel, he continued, were 
currently “copyists,” but had a “keen desire to become exposed to more complex 
maintenance and supply problems calling for the exercise of their own initiative.”165  
They needed more supervision, which the Americans urged the French to provide.166  
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 These problems continued.  In 1955, the VNAF‟s continuing logistical 
inadequacies were a “matter of grave concern” to the USAF:  
The major impediment to progress . . . is the reluctance on the part of the 
FAF advisors to entrust responsibility for planning to the Vietnamese.  
There appears to be a certain amount of passive resistance toward giving 
the Vietnamese feel that they can do their job.  The stock answer to „Why 
don‟t you give the Vietnamese more responsibility?‟ is, „They are not 
capable.  They are not ready to assume responsibility.‟167 
 
 The Americans attributed a great deal of the VNAF‟s problems to their French 
advisors. “This [training] program,” wrote the same author who lamented for the 
Vietnamese mechanics unable to reach their potential in the VNAF, “is hampered by the 
intense anti-French feeling and the superior attitude of the French.”168  According to 
MAAG, the French provided the Vietnamese with “poor or inadequate” logistical 
instruction.169  The USAF saw poor relations between FAF and VNAF “a handicap of 
major consequence . . .”170 
 Several American reports wanted the USAF to participate more in the VNAF‟s 
training.  A February 1955 report included a request to more define American 
involvement in Vietnamese training.171  The language barrier provided one major 
obstacle to this goal.  Many Vietnamese officers spoke French, but few MAAG 
personnel in were similarly qualified, and, at least in May 1955, it appears that no USAF 
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personnel of MAAG were so qualified.  The source in question did not address the 
possibility of Americans learning Vietnamese172  Furthermore, the USAF personnel had 
an unclear role in training the Vietnamese—hence the February 1955 request.  USAF 
instructors wanted their positions clarified.  “The VNAF personnel lack the experience 
and initiative to correct” inadequate French training, one document read, “and USAF 
personnel lack the authority to take remedial action.”173 
 Along with maintenance, logistics, and the training of the Vietnamese, the USAF 
also saw the FAF‟s tactical shortcomings as a major problem.  France benefited in 
Indochina from having no enemy aircraft with which to contend.  Though the FAF 
performed ground-attack, reconnaissance, and airborne operations as well as they could 
with their limited resources, a USAF writer remarked, in January 1954, “There is no air 
defense system in operation, therefore, if enemy air action were introduced, the 
effectiveness of the FAF would be greatly reduced.”174  Another report, in 1953, warned 
that the French needed to establish effective air defense, and that many French pilots had 
minimal training in air-to-air combat.175  Such comments reflected American military 
planners‟ concerns about Communist Chinese intervention in Indochina, as had 
happened in Korea in 1950.  
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 Even without an enemy air force to oppose them, USAF personnel observed in 
January 1954 that the FAF‟s losses were “not exactly at a minimum.”  The French had 
lost fifty-two of the 182 F-8F fighters delivered by MDAP by that time, as well as ten of 
the fifty-five B-26s, a loss rate (from all causes) of 26 percent of the FAF‟s MDAP-
supplied combat aircraft.176  This loss rate spoke to more than just the state of aircraft 
maintenance in the FAF, as it must be remembered that, before the Viet Minh deployed 
37mm anti-aircraft guns at Dien Bien Phu, the French had almost never encountered 
ground fire heavier than machine guns.177  It is significant to note that, except when 
describing French aircraft losses, USAF observers never mentioned or described in 
detail French tactical air support, aerial resupply, or airborne operations.   
 MAAG‟s USAF personnel had some positive comments to say about their 
French counterparts.  A January 1954 report admitted that the FAF “does accomplish its 
current mission in a satisfactory manner according to the French.”178  Another stated, in 
January 1953, that “the morale of the French Air Force is very high” and that the FAF 
supported ground operations against the “rebels.”179  Few other documents from the 
period 1950-54 mentioned the French Air Force‟s high morale, but none indicated the 
reverse.  In a December 1952 Monthly Activity Report, the author admitted that “there is 
                                                 
176 MMAR January 1954, box 1, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
177 At Dien Bien Phu, the Viet Minh massed several batteries of 37mm anti-aircraft guns, which all but 
closed off the French outpost to aerial resupply. 
178 MMAR January 1954, box 1, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
179 Field Estimate, January 1953, box 1, SCGR, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
 60 
a noted trend toward self-improvement as American methods are proven feasible and do 
work when applied with reason and judgment [emphasis added].”180   
 Notable among the positive statements, the USAF asserted that, despite its 
shortcomings, the FAF helped to hold the line in Indochina.  With all their new 
equipment, issued by the Americans, the FAF had turned “the tide of battle with timely 
air support and continued interdiction of enemy supply routes.”181  A January 1954 
report stated that “The MDAP support furnished the FAF has converted it from a weak, 
ineffectual force into a semi-modern air arm according to French standards capable of 
performing a mission in a satisfactory manner.  It is according to the French a standard 
effective combat offensive and defensive weapon. . . .”182  These positive comments 
appeared infrequently in the USAF‟s documents.  Furthermore, considering the Viet 
Minh‟s ability to contest, if not control, large areas of the Indochinese countryside, the 
ease with which the Viet Minh moved supplies by foot and bicycle in hilly jungle 
compared to the difficulty the French endured moving supplies by truck on roads, and 
the failure of the FAF to supply a distant outpost at the decisive moment of the war—
Dien Bien Phu—it would appear that USAF statements about the FAF “turning the tide 
of battle” were written too soon. 
 The USAF saw several reasons for the FAF‟s troubles in Indochina, aside from 
those already mentioned, including inexperience in large scale operations.  Unlike the 
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USAF, “The French lack World War II experience in the logistics support of a modern 
air fleet,” one report remarked.183   During the war, the French only flew an air force of 
significant size for a short time before it was unceremoniously crushed by Germany‟s 
Luftwaffe.  
 The FAF‟s manpower shortages also worried the USAF.  Though the entire 
French war effort starved for manpower, the technical skill requirements of the air force 
made it especially understrength.  Almost every MAAG USAF document mentioned, at 
least once, the criticality of FAF manpower shortages. As early as November 1950, a 
USAF observer wrote “The most hampering factor [for the FAF] is insufficient numbers 
of highly qualified personnel . . . no enlisted French Air Force personnel under the grade 
of Sergeant are assigned for duty in Indochina [due to the French selective service 
system].”184  The problem grew worse.  An April 1953 document stated that “lack of 
personnel within the French Air Force in Indo-China . . . is still the largest single 
impediment encountered in assisting the French toward accomplishment of their goal of 
establishing an adequate and efficient force in being.”185  The FAF‟s manpower shortage 
“hinders the full exploitation and application of the air combat potential.” The shortages 
of pilots, aircrews, and maintenance personnel were all critical.  “Relief from this 
situation [slow/inadequate aircraft maintenance, exhausted mechanics, etc.],” one 
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account declared, “cannot be expected until additional trained technicians are made 
available.”186  
 The shortage in personnel made all other problems secondary.  Though the 
French had many competent mechanics with anywhere from five to fifteen years of 
experience, they did not have enough of them to go around.187  Shortages of capable 
personnel caused part of the logistical problem suffered by the French.188  One 1953 
report lamented that France‟s situation in Indochina could not improve “until the Air 
Forces of French Indochina are properly augmented with critically needed flight and 
support personnel.”189  When the FAF received small numbers of H-11 helicopters, they 
had great difficulty keeping them in the air because of “the critical shortage of [French] 
helicopter mechanics.”190   
 The USAF personnel of MAAG criticized the French for the FAF‟s problems, 
but they also targeted MDAP.  USAF authors complained about the quality of MDAP 
materials and the slowness of MDAP deliveries. In January 1953, 7 million of the 12 
million .50 caliber machine gun rounds available to the FAF were corroded and 
unusable—the MAAG author noted that the ammunition boxes in question were labeled 
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“For Training Use in Continental US Only.”191  A January 1954 Monthly Activity 
Report accused MDAP of slow deliveries:  “The slow working of MDAP in developing 
programs, procuring funds from Congress, slow procurement and late delivery of 
urgently needed items does not fully satisfy the requirements of supporting an active 
war.”192  Sometimes, deliveries may have been on time, but were unrequested and lacked 
utility, such as inapplicable instruction manuals for use by French personnel:  
There has been an increasing number of publications arriving which were 
not requisitioned and which are not applicable [to the FAF].  Recent 
examples are: One on the winterization of aircraft, another in ski 
equipment for aircraft . . . stocklists that have long since been outdated, 
receipt of complete price lists. . . in practically all cases, these  
[publications] arrived by priority air cargo at a time when air cargo space 
is at a premium.  Once they arrive, it is necessary to closely screen all 
[items] to determine which should be delivered to FAF.  Those which are 
not, are then burned.  500 lbs is a rough estimate of the quantity destroyed 
since 1 January of this year [1954]. 
 The USAF had a bleak assessment of the FAF.  There were a few complimentary 
features—the FAF‟s high morale (before the ceasefire), the ability of the FAF to support 
ground operations, and, in the earlier years, the apparent willingness of the French to 
update their logistical methods.  The USAF also spread some of the blame to the MDAP 
program.  Ultimately, however, the USAF saw the FAF in a poor light.  The French Air 
Force lacked effective air defense, either in flak or in air-to-air combat ability, rendering 
them exposed to air attack in the event of formal Chinese (or even Soviet) intervention.  
The French were not training a replacement air force, the VNAF, which would leave the 
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nascent Vietnamese state without the effective use of aircraft in any coming combat 
against the communist North.  The FAF suffered from severe personnel shortages.  And, 
perhaps most galling of all to MAAG‟s USAF personnel, French airmen apparently 
ignored American advice on updating their logistical practices. This made French air 
bases disorganized and unkempt places, their aircraft run ragged, and French ground 
forces without reliable support and resupply from the air.  
 The frustrations of MAAG‟s USAF personnel can be summed up with a USAF 
January 1954 assessment. “Lack of trained personnel, inability to formulate long-range 
logistics and operational plans, plus continued utilization of obsolescent accounting and 
maintenance procedures, contribute to the reduced effectiveness of the French Air Force 
which no amount of logistic support can overcome.”193  The USAF was unimpressed 
with their French counterparts in Indochina. 
 
THE NAVY 
 
 The US Navy (USN) personnel of MAAG contributed much less material to 
MAAG‟s documents than did those of the Army and Air Force.  What the Navy did 
report was mixed.  US Navy authors praised the French riverine forces, but criticized 
French maintenance of ships and facilities.  The quality of France‟s blue water forces 
and their training of the nascent Vietnamese navies also disappointed the Americans of 
MAAG. 
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 The French navy‟s (FRN) had a two-fold mission in Indochina. It conducted 
riverine operations against the Viet Minh and in support of various French outposts, and 
interdicted Viet Minh attempts to move supplies from China by sea to various points 
along the Indochinese coast; and provided escort to other ocean vessels if necessary.194   
 To achieve its objectives, the FRN had 12,000 men, including unskilled, 
indigenous laborers.  French naval personnel served for 18 month tours.195  The French 
operated several small aircraft carriers during the war, including the Arromanches, a 
British-built light carrier on loan to the FRN.196  Primarily, the FRN deployed vessels 
suitable for riverine operations, such as World War II vintage landing ships.  With these 
craft they formed the Dinassaut units, detachments of shallow-bottomed FRN craft 
which patrolled Indochina‟s many inland waterways and conducted amphibious attacks 
and hit-and-run missions against the Viet Minh.  French combat operations near the 
coast could take advantage of fire support from their handful of destroyer-sized surface 
ships.  In addition, the FRN operated aircraft from shore-side bases.  The United States 
provided the FRN with the vast majority of its boats, ships, and aircraft. 
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 USN reports focused on the conditions of FRN vessels.  Overall, American 
observers found French ships to be functional, but, as a 1953 report commented, “based 
on the United States standards their long-term maintenance procedures are found to be 
deficient. . . . Guns are in good condition, electronics operate satisfactorily . . .  but hull 
maintenance, cleanliness, upkeep of magazines, stowage of ammunition and living 
spaces are neglected.  When an officer from the Navy section, MAAG visits an MDAP-
furnished item, his observations are based upon United States Navy standards, but scaled 
to the standards generally found and considered satisfactory in Indochina.”197  The 
Americans ranked several ships visited in July 1954—the Rapiere, Jonquille, and 
Trident—as serviceable, but remarked upon “dirty and unkempt” crew quarters and 
filthy engine bilges.198  Some French ships received fine reviews from the Americans, as 
a 1952 report found of the Golo, whose material condition was “good, and the morale of 
the officers and crew is excellent,” but most reports emphasized substandard French 
maintenance.199 
 In addition to vessels, MAAG personnel also inspected French navy land 
facilities.  In this area, the French faired better.  A February 1952 report commented that 
“There is plenty of warehouse space here [in Cat Lai, a French naval base near Saigon], 
good hangars, and good handling facilities.”200  Navy observations in December 1952 
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found several FRN airbases in good condition.201  By 1953, US Navy personnel 
observed continuing improvements in the Saigon Navy Yard.202  
 MAAG‟s USN evaluators gave considerable praise to France‟s riverine 
operations.  Two thirds of France‟s navy personnel were “khaki navy”—or, by American 
terminology, “brown water.”203  Vietnam is well suited to riverine operations, due to the 
massive Mekong and Red River deltas, in Tonkin and Cochinchina, respectively.  France 
deployed their riverine forces to these inland waterways, in order to deny their use to the 
Viet Minh, and to keep them open for French military and commercial traffic.204  
France‟s khaki navy executed numerous successful riverine attacks during the war, and 
were instrumental in defeating three large-scale attacks made by the Viet Minh in their 
attempt to end the war in early 1951.205  The presence of these riverine forces, described 
one Navy report, made Vietnam‟s rivers “safe in all areas occupied by friendly 
forces.”206  Another document reviewed the French as “probably better qualified by 
experience and equipment than any other naval force for the particular type of river 
warfare which confronts it in Indochina. . . . Amphibious-type vessels (armored and  
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transport) permit its use of the inland rivers and canals, and to deny their extensive use to 
the enemy.  [Combined with carrier-based air support, the French Navy] constitutes an 
effective river and coastal navy very well suited for present warfare in Indochina.”207  As 
well as combat operations, France‟s khaki navy performed an important logistical 
function on the rivers, when the Viet Minh and/or terrain made overland supply delivers 
impossible. One Navy writer described the task as “a constant and heavy undertaking 
which they accomplish with facility.”208   
 The Americans did not have such strong praise for France‟s blue water navy.  
After admitting to the riverine force‟s effectiveness, a January 1954 report added that, 
“In other more orthodox naval warfare, they [the French] are not trained nor well 
equipped.”209  American observers cited vulnerability to submarines as a major French 
handicap.  Though the Viet Minh did not have any submarines to capitalize on this 
weakness, American planners were acutely aware that the Soviets, and perhaps even the 
Chinese, did possess such vessels, and, American concerns of overt Sino-Soviet 
involvement in Indochina (as happened in Korea), made this concern understandable. 
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the large numbers of water-going merchant vessels in that country. Charles Koburger, to give some insight 
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off the Annamese coast, he counted more than 500 small craft whose sails appeared to touch each other, 
giving the appearance of a white sea (The French Navy in Indochina, 39).” 
209 Indo-China Country Statement for Presentation of the 1955 MDA Program, 26 January 1954, box 2, 
SCGR, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA.  
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 US Navy advisors also criticized the French for their slowness in establishing a 
Vietnamese navy.  American personnel complained that the French only trained 
Vietnamese as crews for small boats and, like their US Army counterparts, wanted the 
Vietnamese sailors to have more responsibilities within the French Navy.210  
 The Navy‟s reports touched on a variety of issues, but what may be even more 
notable is their brevity.  The Navy section of any given MAAG report was almost 
always the shortest section. While the Army reported extensively on France‟s ground 
units, and the Air Force on French shortcomings, the Navy wrote very little, often 
including only a few ship inspections.  Why the Navy observers wrote so little is unclear.  
By comparing the tons of US-supplied equipment in Indochina to the number of MAAG 
personnel available to monitor them, the Navy was no more overworked than the Air 
Force personnel, and much less so than the Army.211  Furthermore, USN authors were 
also uninterested in the FRN‟s amphibious operations, some of them comparable to 
assaults the USN had conducted during World War II.212  
                                                 
210 Field Estimate, February 1952, box 1, SCGR, MAAG Adjutant General Division,  RG 472, NARA. 
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 Like the US Army, the US Navy‟s had an uneven assessment of the French 
Navy. Whereas French naval facilities pleased them and they praised France‟s “khaki” 
sailors for hard fighting on Vietnam‟s rivers and canals, they criticized FRN 
maintenance standards, conventional naval abilities, and training of the Vietnamese.  
Nevertheless, their limited commentary makes any assessment of their attitude toward 
the French more general.   
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The US Air Force and Navy sections of MAAG presented an unusual collection 
of assessments of French performance in Indochina. Like the Army, they criticized the 
logistical performance of the French and their training of native (Indochinese) forces, but 
also emphasized the positive impact of American equipment on France‟s military 
position in Indochina, and the bravery and capability of French personnel in combat.   
Despite these agreements with Army assessments, however, USAF and USN 
personnel also presented some contradictory observations. For example, the USAF 
alternated between praising the FAF for turning “the tide of battle with timely air 
support” and criticizing it for heavy losses and a substandard ratio of maintenance-to-
flight hours. 213  The tone of USAF reports gives a reader the impression that the French 
were lucky to get aircraft off the ground, let alone turn the “tide of battle” or even carry 
                                                 
213 Field Estimate, February 1952, box 1, SCGR, MAAG Adjutant General Division, RG 472, NARA. 
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out their “mission in a satisfactory manner,” but several of their reports ultimately 
argued these points.214   
 Though MAAG‟s Navy personnel praised the riverine operations, they had little 
else to say about them.  This is also surprising, as in the immediate post-World War II 
environment, the US Navy found itself in a state of flux.  Due to the apparent dominance 
of the Air Force in the immediate aftermath of the war, the Navy‟s strategic value 
appeared limited to politicians. Even officers in the Navy wondered what their ocean-
going branch could accomplish, when the Soviet Union had no navy to speak of, and 
atomic weaponry could sink or irradiate entire fleets with a single blow.  These problems 
combined with a hasty demobilization to leave the Navy unsure of its future.215   
In retrospect, it should have been in the US Navy‟s best interest to pay more 
attention to France‟s riverine forces.  These types of operations could have been a new 
direction for the Navy to take, as it argued to continue its own existence in the atomic 
age.  The Navy predicted potential involvement in peacekeeping operations, for which 
riverine operations would be well suited.  Organizing riverine units would allow the 
Navy to apply very specific force in an unstable nation‟s waterways, using shore parties 
and .50 caliber machine guns instead of Marine divisions and battleship cannon.  The  
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French Navy‟s inland operations provided an excellent opportunity to observe riverine 
forces in action.216  MAAG‟s Navy personnel were in a good position to do just that, but 
did not take the opportunity.  Indeed, the very environment of the Navy may have left 
these men uninterested in riverine operations.  From 1949 to 1954, the Navy‟s personnel 
digest, All Hands, printed only two articles loosely dealing with riverine operations—
one an excerpt from a book on naval fighting during the American Civil War, and 
another about US Navy-manned, repurposed German patrol boats on the Rhine.217  
It is significant that, unlike the Army, both the Air Force and Navy expressed 
concern over France‟s ability to resist a conventional, external attack on Indochina.  
Though they did not mention it specifically, they appear to have envisioned a scenario 
similar to the Chinese intervention in Korea.  USAF writers complained of France‟s 
inability to resist conventional air attacks, with limited air-to-air combat training and 
little or no air defense assets in-theater, and Navy personnel criticized the French for its 
lack of anti-submarine and other “blue water” capabilities.  Why they focused on such 
concerns, while Army observers never did, is unclear.  This concern of large scale 
Chinese intervention helps explain why USAF personnel so criticized the French. 
Despite their admissions that the FAF could carry out its support duties in “an acceptable 
manner,” they may have worried that the FAF was only a single Sino-Soviet intervention 
away from total destruction.  
                                                 
216 Davis, Postwar Defense Policy, 158.  
217 “Book Excerpt,” All Hands No. 393, November 1949: 59-63, and Kenneth Barnsdale, “Watch on the 
Rhine,” All Hands No. 396, February 1950: 9-10. 
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 Together, the US Air Force and Navy held negative opinions of their French 
counterparts in Indochina.  Some of these opinions were on the lax maintenance and 
logistical standards of the FAF and FRN and their shortcomings in training Indochinese 
personnel. Others were more subjective, reflecting concerns about the intervention of 
major Sino-Chinese forces.  Finally, the US Navy, as an institution, was not interested in 
the small-scale of naval operations France carried out in Indochina.  In the main, both 
the USAF and USN proffered much different versions of France‟s performance than did 
the US Army.  
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                                            CHAPTER V 
                                         CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 How, then, did MAAG as a whole see France‟s military performance in 
Indochina?  MAAG‟s constituent services held a variety of opinions. The Army, Air 
Force, and Navy representatives agreed that the French were logistically inefficient and 
paid too little attention to training their Indochinese allies.  The Army and the Air Force 
both questioned the combat abilities of their French counterparts.  The Army saw the 
French as passive, allowing the Viet Minh to retain the initiative; the Air Force, believed 
that the French used their aircraft poorly and were vulnerable to air attack, should the 
Soviets or Chinese enter the war.  The Army and the Navy were both complimentary of 
French combat units.  As a whole, however, the negative appraisal of the French 
attributed to MAAG by historians only applies to the USAF personnel, not to MAAG as 
a whole—the Army in particular rated the French well, despite their misgivings about 
logistics and passive “oil slick” tactics.   
 An examination of a variety of MAAG documents reveals that at the top levels, 
MAAG‟s official tone was neutral toward the French, and sometimes even 
complimentary.  The summarizing section of any given MAAG report emphasized the 
effect had by MDAP-provided equipment and supplies and the status of this materiel.  
These summaries tended to lean toward the US Army‟s positive assessment of the 
French rather than the more critical Air Force and Navy perspectives.  In some ways, the 
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assessments conveyed an optimistic view of the war in Indochina that individual 
observers may not have shared.  They often disregarded the poor positions of the French 
and condemnatory reports of the US Air Force, and emphasized the positive effects of 
American support, and the need for continued resistance against communist expansion in 
Asia.   
 MAAG reports emphasized improvement in French handling of MDAP materiel 
and the positive effect this materiel had on the war effort.  “End-use inspections and 
other observations,” one report from 1952 stated, “reflect the increasing ability of the 
French and Associated States Forces to store, use, and properly maintain material 
received under MDAP.”218  Though MAAG expressed that materiel was not always 
cared for to the standards of the US Army, it was at least maintained in an “acceptable 
manner.”  The equipment granted to the French enabled them to “perform their assigned 
missions in an excellent manner.”219  Other Monthly Activity Reports echoed this 
sentiment: “. . . the French and Associated States forces are capable of handling properly 
and storing MDAP materiel and that materiel and equipment are being used for the 
purpose intended,” and “[MDAP provided] equipment on hand in all units visited will 
enable these units to perform their missions in an excellent manner.” 220  This positive 
attitude reached an unrealistic peak in when a January 1954 document, after emphasizing 
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the need for continued MDAP support for the French, stated, “. . . it is considered that 
the French Union forces have the capability of destroying the Viet Minh in the next few 
years.”221  In May and June of that year, the Viet Minh annihilated many of the best units 
in the French army, and peace negotiations had commenced at Geneva. 
 Some reports by MAAG personnel apparently ignored the complaints of non-
Army members of the group.  For example, after his departure from Indochina in April 
1954, former-MAAG Chief Major General Thomas J. H. Trapnell wrote that American 
materiel given to the French air force “has converted it into a modern air arm capable of 
performing its combat mission in a highly satisfactory manner. It is an effective 
offensive or defensive combat weapon, the full potential of which has not been 
realized.”222  Trapnell gave this report after years of negative USAF reports on the FAF. 
That MAAG‟s reports tended to reflect the US Army‟s view of the French rather 
than that of the USAF and USN is not surprising, considering the overwhelming 
majority of materiel the US sent to Indochina was intended for ground forces.  Though 
the Air Force wrote heated reports, often with obvious frustration, the French air force 
they investigated represented only a small portion of the overall force commanded by the 
French in Indochina.  Between them, the French air force and navy fielded around 
20,000 men, while the army consisted of hundreds of thousands.  Because of France‟s 
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limited resources, much of the war depended upon the operations of French and French-
allied army units.  These units, patrolling the swamps, rice paddies, and cane fields of 
Indochina‟s lowlands, and battling through the jungles and mountains of the highlands, 
were the deciding force of France‟s war in Indochina.  Their success in rooting out Viet 
Minh troops, so it seemed, would determine the course of the war.   
Not only were the majority of MAAG‟s personnel Army, but every MAAG Chief 
between 1950 and 1956, was an Army general officer.  Furthermore, occasional 
contradictory elements of USAF and USN reports may have weakened their positions in 
the eyes of their MAAG Chiefs.  Both of these helped push MAAG summaries toward 
emphasizing Army opinions of the French. 
 MAAG report summaries painted an unrealistically optimistic image of the war 
in Indochina, focusing as they did on successful shipments of US supplies, weapons, and 
equipment.  They could be criticized for this assessment, but it must be remembered that 
MAAG-Indochina operated under difficult conditions.  Their small size meant 
tremendous workloads, and thus limited available time per soldier, airman, and sailor.  
They used their resources to focus on their primary mission, to process and monitor US 
materiel provided to the French.  When Army personnel made it into the field, they did 
so in small teams, and rarely to direct combat zones.  Air Force observers could not ride 
along on airstrikes with French pilots.  Amongst the services, only the USN seemed to 
neglect direct observation of, and interaction with, the primary forces of their French 
opposites, France‟s brown-water riverine units.  
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 MAAG‟s assessment of the French tied in neatly to the prevailing sentiments of 
US military aid—that its use could prevent communist expansion around the world, and 
that the very presence of military aid was enough to ensure success, without regard to 
how it was put to use.  Though this hope was checked at Dien Bien Phu, MAAG clung 
to it in the years before that fateful battle.  Anti-communism, and the assumption that 
communist nations around the world served Moscow, appeared in MAAG writings.  
General Trapnell, in his debriefing after command passed to General John W. O‟Daniel, 
hoped French Indochina would “occupy a blocking position against the expansion of 
Chinese Communist influence” into Southeast Asia, fearing that if the communists were 
successful there, Burma, Malaya, and Thailand would surely fall, followed in time by 
India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.  He 
added that “as in Korea, Iran, Malaya, and Burma, the war in Indochina is not a separate 
entity.  It is another tentacle of the octopus, another brush fire on the periphery of the 
iron and bamboo curtains.  The problem can only be solved completely if the masters of 
the Kremlin decide that Indochina should be abandoned in favor of more profitable 
enterprises elsewhere.”223 
 MAAG‟s Monthly Activity Reports, field estimates of effectiveness, and other 
documents cannot be used alone to understand the French Indochina War.  Reports from 
March, April, May, and June 1954 do not mention the fighting at Dien Bien Phu.  The 
ceasefire in July 1954 is only commented upon in passing.  Very little of the war‟s  
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desperation can be seen in the MAAG documents.  France‟s last stands in places like 
Cao Bang and Dien Bien Phu; the embattled marches of French mobile groups through 
the Vietnamese Highlands; the terrible human cost of French punitive measures and Viet 
Minh reprisals; the Viet Minh‟s willingness to advance through artillery and napalm, no 
matter the cost, to achieve their objectives—none of these make an appearance in the 
MAAG summaries. 
To MAAG, the war was a matter of cataloging materiel delivered, training visits, 
and equipment inspections.  What the men in MAAG wanted in Indochina can be seen 
through them: an optimistic “can-do” attitude that the communists, through application 
of American materiel and logistical might, could be stopped.  In December 1955, 
Lieutenant General Samuel T. Williams, then MAAG Chief, spoke at a monthly 
advisor‟s conference, as, by that period, Americans and Frenchmen were working 
together to train the growing Vietnamese Army.  His tone was positive. “All of us, 
regardless of trials and tribulations, frustration, and at times discouragement, must 
maintain an optimistic view point . . . We Americans and French have time to be anti-
communist, only.”224 
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